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SOVEREIGN DEBT  
RESTRUCTURING, ODIOUS DEBT, AND 
THE POLITICS OF DEBT RELIEF 
ROBERT K. RASMUSSEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Odious debt is more of a literature than a doctrine. Going back to at least 
the 1920s, one can find arguments that countries should not have to pay back 
debts that are labeled “odious.”1 The central intuition is that the citizens of a 
country should not have to pay for the debts incurred by a prior “odious” 
regime when those funds did not benefit these citizens. It is simply not right to 
ask people to pay for funds from which they did not benefit, especially when the 
lender knew of this fact when it made its loan. The doctrine traditionally has an 
ex post flavor to it. The question is whether the acts of the past are such that we 
should relieve a country of what would otherwise be a current obligation. The 
guiding intuition is moral rather than economic.2 
In addition to this retrospective view, the doctrine today is also supported 
by the observation that it may deprive odious regimes of access to funds and 
hence hasten their demise. The goal of those who support a robust odious debt 
doctrine is to inhibit lending for projects that do not benefit the people. Lenders 
would know at the time they make the loan that they face a serious likelihood 
of having their debt repudiated before it is repaid.3 The threat of repudiation 
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 1. The classic definition of “odious debt” is attributed to Sack’s 1927 work. See ALEXANDER 
NAHUM SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET 
AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES (1927). Claims relating to the exact date go back at least to 1898, 
when the United States argued that Cuba’s debts to Spain should not be repaid. 
 2. See, e.g., Noreen Hertz, Why We Must Defuse the Debt Threat, 24 CONTRIB. POL. ECON. 123, 
125 (2005) (“We must demand, as a first principle of debt relief, that loans made to illegitimate 
regimes . . . should not have to be repaid by the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of those 
originally oppressed and pillaged.”). 
 3. The strength of this argument turns on the ability of the odious sovereign to repay before it is 
ousted. A robust doctrine of odious debt, unless accompanied by some mechanism to recover payments 
made on such debt, would create incentives to shorten maturities on the debt. Shorter maturities may 
increase the pain felt by the citizens, at least in the short run, as the despotic regime devotes a larger 
percentage of its revenues to service its debt. 
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would prevent the loan from being made in the first instance. Because the 
odious regime would thus have its access to capital constricted, it might become 
more difficult for the disreputable regime to remain in power. Whereas the 
motivations remain largely moral in nature—that is, to hasten the end of a 
repressive regime—the argument is economic to the extent that it relies on the 
incentive effects created by the doctrine.4 
These arguments, whatever their merits, have found little purchase in actual 
practice. Despite calls both today and in the past for eliminating debts based on 
the nature of the debt itself, there have been few cases in which a nation has 
secured relief on these grounds.5 Even those inclined toward a robust vision of 
international law can point to no treaty or customary practice that would justify 
describing the odious debt doctrine as an actual part of international law. The 
doctrine is more aspirational than operational.  The current work in the field 
thus truly seems to be merely an academic exercise. 
The recent (and still ongoing) experience of Iraq reveals both the doctrine’s 
allure and its impotency. After the U.S.-led invasion, the new Iraqi government 
found itself in dire financial straits. Estimates of the country’s long-term debt 
exceeded $120 billion.6 All realized that the new Iraq regime could never repay 
such an amount.7 Moreover, the less debt relief that the country was able to 
secure, the more financial strain would be put on what many hoped would be a 
fledging democracy. Iraq has many pressing needs, and the more funds that the 
government has to send out of the country, the more difficult it becomes to 
even hope for broad-based citizen support for the extant leaders. 
The attraction of the odious debt doctrine in this situation is readily 
apparent. The United States and its allies did not want the new Iraqi 
government saddled with its existing debt burden. Moreover, no one contested 
the view that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant who spent extravagantly on himself 
and his confidants while most of the country’s citizens struggled. The doctrine 
seemed to provide a way to “legally” justify eliminating debts while 
condemning the prior regime. (Unfortunately, there was a bit of a technical 
problem in that much of Iraq’s debt was incurred for what appears to have been 
 
 4. For an argument that the incentive effects are more mixed than the standard account, see 
Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 33 (Summer 2007). 
 5. For more fulsome reviews of the history of odious debt, see James Feinerman, Odious Debt, 
Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (Autumn 
2007); Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 
(Summer 2007). 
 6. See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ: DEBT RELIEF 1 (2005), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44019.pdf (“Iraq’s public debt was estimated to be U.S. 
$120.2 in nominal value as of the end of 2004.”). 
 7. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS 265 (2007) (reporting that Iraq had 
debts of about $121 billion and GDP of about $25 billion annually). 
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legitimate purposes; Saddam’s lavish expenditures—especially those after the 
first Gulf War—were funded by oil revenues and not loans.)8 
The calls for using the odious debt doctrine to relieve Iraq’s financial 
distress have led to a renewed focus on odious debt, in both the public and 
scholarly arenas.9 There are serious ongoing attempts to create a usable odious 
debt doctrine.10 Although the various proposals differ in important respects, 
they share the same goal. They seek to flesh out the rather obvious problems 
with the odious debt doctrine as it has been articulated to date. These include 
defining which regimes are odious, identifying which debts should be within the 
doctrine’s scope, calculating how much relief should be granted, and ensuring 
that non-odious regimes do not find their access to the financial markets 
constrained. 
In this discussion, the relationship between the doctrine of odious debt on 
the one hand and sovereign-debt restructuring on the other has been under-
theorized. Standing alongside the literature on odious debts is work that 
attempts to formulate the optimal regime for restructuring a sovereign’s debt 
when the sovereign is in financial distress. Whereas the proposals range from 
endorsing the current ad hoc approach11 to the creation of a full-blown 
sovereign-bankruptcy regime,12 they share the goal of providing a system 
whereby an indebted nation can pare back its debt to sustainable levels. 
The relationship between the calls for a vibrant odious debt doctrine and a 
framework for restructuring sovereign debt has not been fully settled. For some, 
the odious debt seems to act as an imperfect substitute for the lack of a more 
general restructuring regime.13 For others, the two are distinct, and loans to a 
prosperous but repressive country could be void.14 What reach the odious debt 
doctrine should have depends on how one resolves this question. 
Regardless of the relationship between odious debt and sovereign-debt 
restructuring, one theme permeates both literatures. The impulse seems to be to 
create a “law” here in the sense of a set of rules with a modicum of predictable 
 
 8. See JONATHAN STANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ’S ECONOMY: PAST, PRESENT, 
FUTURE C-53 (June 2003), available at http://export.gov/iraq/pdf/crs_iraq_economy.pdf. The problem 
created by the doctrine’s linkage of debt and expenditure is that money is fungible. Money borrowed 
for necessary projects could free up internal funds that could then be used to engage in repressive 
activities. It is for this reason that Patrick Bolton and David Skeel argue that the focus needs to be on 
odious regimes rather than odious debts. See Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious 
Regimes?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Autumn 2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, “Odious Debts,” 292 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 4, 42 (Nov. 2003); Michael 
Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
W8953, 2002). 
 10. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, et al., The Odious Debts of an Odious Regime: Piercing the 
Government Veil, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007). 
 11. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best Interest 
of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 9. 
 14. See, e.g., Bolton & Skeel, supra note 8. 
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results.15 One factor that seems to play little role in any of the proposals is the 
political importance of the country seeking relief to the interests of those—both 
public and private—that have lent the money at issue. The various 
reconceptualizations of the doctrine that have been put forth would be available 
to all countries. No special break is offered to countries that the world powers 
view as strategically important. Iraq and Sudan would stand on the same 
footing. Indeed, for those who view international law as distinct from 
realpolitick, this universal availability can be viewed as a praiseworthy feature 
of these efforts. 
The history of the debt relief in Iraq, however, provides something of a 
cautionary note. In the end, Iraq has received debt relief, but it expressly 
eschewed relying on the odious debt doctrine.16 It did not seek to walk away 
from its past debts based on the nature of the Saddam government. Part of the 
reason seems to be the instincts of the private lenders. They can accede to 
political pressure and treat it as a one-off event. Acknowledging the doctrine of 
odious debt, on the other hand, exposes them to an uncertain risk. Once a 
precedent is created, it is unclear when it will be applied next.17 Indeed, the 
recent calls of Ecuador and Norway to repudiate illegitimate debt provide vivid 
examples of the private lenders’ concerns. 
The political imperative—especially on the part of the U.S. and British 
administrations, who had staked so much on the war effort—was such that Iraq 
was able to strike a deal reducing a substantial portion of its debt.18 Its 
remaining obligations were rescheduled, with payments to start in the future. 
The new government was thus provided a breathing space, at least from its 
foreign-debt woes. The unavoidable fact is that it is the strategic importance of 
Iraq and not the impulses behind the odious debt doctrine that is responsible 
for the reduction that the country has achieved in its external debt. 
Iraq is by no means unique in this regard. One does not have to look hard to 
see that political concerns often loom large when a country is seeking relief 
from its external debt.19 Yet this is not necessarily a cause for concern. Some 
legal academics contributing to the emerging literature on both odious debt and 
sovereign-debt restructuring generally have done important work in bankruptcy 
 
 15. Most in this area would be content to end up in a system where, according to Henkin’s 
legendary observation, “most states follow most of the rules most of the time.”  
 16. Iraq’s finance minister stated, 
Iraq’s need for very substantial debt relief derives from the economic realities facing a post-
conflict country that has endured decades of financial corruption and mismanagement under 
the Saddam regime. Principles of public international law such as the odious debt doctrine, 
whatever their legal vitality, are not the reason why Iraq is seeking this relief. 
Interview by Felix Salmon with Adil Abdul Mahdi, Interim Iraqi Finance Minister, quoted in Anna 
Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 406 (2005). 
 17. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 255. 
 18. See id. at 250–73 (describing the negotiations that led to the debt reduction agreement). 
 19. See id. at 252 (“Many of the debt deals that the Paris Club handles involve a combustible 
mixture of a raw international politics and rocket science financial engineering.”). 
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literature.20 In that literature, it is an article of faith for many that the 
government should not pick winners and losers. By and large, most endorse the 
proposition that the ultimate success of a company has to come through 
competition. Attempts to save various businesses have received much scorn. 
The bankruptcy of Eastern Airlines remains as an example quickly deployed to 
remind all that good intentions do not make a competitive company. 
It is not clear that this instinct should be transported to the world of 
sovereign debt. To be sure, one can make a general case for some minimal level 
of relief. Just as individuals deserve a fresh start, so may countries.21 Yet beyond 
that, it may be that additional debt relief should be left to the political process. 
Indeed, there is a tension here. To the extent that one views the questions of 
sovereign debt relief as questions of finance—that is, maximizing a state’s access 
to credit by relieving the debt overhang—one will endorse different policies 
than if one views the sovereign market as one that involves political dimensions 
as well.22 
II 
SOVEREIGN-DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND ODIOUS DEBTS 
The academic scholarship surrounding issues of sovereign debt has exploded 
over the last few years.23 This renewed interest on the part of the academy can 
be traced to two events.24 The first is the proposal by Anne Krueger, First 
Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to 
create a sovereign-debt-restructuring mechanism.25 The IMF endorsed the 
creation of such an institution, but the United States declined to support it. The 
U.S. government instead put its weight behind amending the terms of the public 
bonds that a country issues so that they could be restructured through the 
 
 20. Scholars writing in both fields include Mechele Dickerson, Adam Feibelman, Steven Schwarcz, 
and David Skeel. 
 21. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State Into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 
53 Emory L.J. 1159, 1179 (2004) (comparing discharge of sovereign debt with the “fresh start” 
individual debtors may receive under U.S. bankruptcy law). 
 22. Anna Gelpern’s contribution to this conference recognizes this tension. She articulates the 
ways in which government lending are political and not economically driven, and suggests that in 
distress situations government debts receive a lower priority. See Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Summer 2007). 
 23. An extensive list can be found in Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent 
Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Autumn 2007). 
 24. This is in addition to the tireless efforts of Mitu Gulati and Lee Buccheit to interest a diverse 
range of scholars in this important topic. 
 25. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt 
Workouts, 53 EMORY L.J. 657, 673–77 (2004).  To be sure, important work on sovereign debt predates 
the default of Argentina. See, e.g., Kunibert Raffer, Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International 
Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face, 18 WORLD DEV. 301 (1990).  Indeed, 
sovereign debt restructuring became a topic of concern after the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s. Yet, 
it seems to be that Krueger’s proposal sparked a new round of debate. See, e.g., Conference on 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy, 53 EMORY L.J. (Special Issue) 657 
(2004); Lee C. Buchheit, A Quarter Century of Sovereign Debt Management: An Overview, 35 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 37 (2004). 
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collective action of the bondholders.26 Whether it was the tepid reception by the 
United States, the ability of Argentina to procure debt relief through its own 
hardball tactics, or a lack of interest by those who lend to sovereigns, it seems to 
be the case that there is little current push in policy circles for a legal framework 
designed to address the problems that arise when a country cannot repay its 
debts. While the creation of a general sovereign-debt-restructuring mechanism 
is currently off the table, academics have furthered our thinking on what 
features such a regime should contain. When policy makers return to sovereign-
debt restructuring, they will have a broad array of choices. 
The second event which has drawn attention to issues of sovereign debt is 
the invasion of Iraq and the establishment of a new government there. The 
doctrine of odious debt was pulled out of the closet and dusted off as people 
looked for a way to address the financial problems that Iraq faced post-Saddam 
Hussein. Odious debt is in some ways more limited and in some ways more 
broad than the general sovereign-debt restructuring that was the focus of 
policymakers only a few years ago. It is more limited in that only certain loans 
fall within the doctrine’s purview. The regime has to be “odious” and the loans 
have to be issued with the lender understanding that the proceeds would not 
benefit the nation’s citizens.27 It is broader in that, for loans that are deemed 
odious, they are eliminated rather than reduced.28 Whereas the various 
sovereign-debt restructuring mechanisms that have been proposed seek to pare 
down debt to sustainable levels, the odious debt doctrine does not focus on 
overall debt loads. It is the nature of the debt rather than the amount of the 
burden that determines whether relief will be granted. 
With substantial progress having been made on paring down Iraq’s debt, 
calls for an aggressive application of the doctrine of odious debt have faded 
from policy circles. Even though the process of putting Iraq’s financial affairs in 
order is by no means complete, it seems safe to say that the odious debt 
doctrine has had no impact on the process.29 Recent actions by Ecuador suggest 
that it may attempt to rely on some version of the odious debt doctrine as it 
attempts to reduce its outstanding debt obligations, but it is far from clear that 
such arguments will find a receptive audience. 
Academics, recognizing the underdeveloped state of the doctrine, are 
currently creating a better doctrine. Each aspect of the doctrine is being 
subjected to rigorous scrutiny, and new, more complete versions are being 
 
 26. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 110–32. For an argument that such amendments are insufficient to 
solve the sovereign-debt problem because they do not address the problem of interbond negotiations, 
see David A. Skeel, Can Majority Voting Provisions Do it All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417 (2003). 
 27. Patrick Bolton and David Skeel take issue with this aspect of the traditional doctrine. See 
Bolton & Skeel, supra note 8. 
 28. Some of the proposals in this conference suggest a rethinking of this aspect of the doctrine. See 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Autumn 
2007). 
 29. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 255 (“While no one disagreed that Saddam was odious, there were 
economic and political reasons not to employ the argument . . . .”). 
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proposed. To the extent that odious debt again resurfaces as a policy issue, this 
latest round of work may provide officials with a useful starting place. 
The precise relationship between the proposals for restructuring sovereign 
debt and for creating a workable odious debt doctrine remains unclear. At one 
extreme, the doctrines seem to be substitutes for each other. Many who prefer 
odious debt seem to do so because the current mechanism for sovereign-debt 
restructuring does not provide, to their minds, adequate relief. Such a tendency 
is most evident in the calls to use the doctrine in the case of Iraq. Iraq’s debt 
load provided an impetus for seeking a way to cut back on its obligation, and 
the claim of odious debt was a means to that end. 
For those having such an instinct, the first, best world would be one in which 
there was a generous system of sovereign-debt relief. Distressed countries could 
repair to the system and have their debt trimmed substantially. Were such a 
regime in place, there would be no work for the odious debt doctrine to 
perform. All countries would be entitled to the same baseline of relief. Absent 
such a system, however, expansive use of the doctrine could provide at least 
partial relief. 
Others seem to take the opposite approach. For them, odious debt is 
conceptually distinct from sovereign-debt restructuring.30 Even the most affluent 
country could annul debts that were incurred by a prior, odious regime. Even 
were the world to embrace an optimal sovereign-debt restructuring regime, this 
would leave the scope of the odious debt doctrine untouched. Patrick Bolton 
and David Skeel adhere to this view of odious debt.31 Their proposal to have the 
United Nations Security Council label a regime as odious has nothing to do with 
relieving financial distress. To be sure, they acknowledge that the number of 
regimes likely to be tagged with this label is quite small. But since they are not 
relying on this mechanism to address the general problem of sovereign 
indebtedness,32 this is not a telling criticism. They quite rightly respond that, 
measured solely by the criteria of creating incentives to undermine repressive 
regimes, their proposal is a step in the right direction. 
One can also imagine a third possible relationship between sovereign-debt 
restructuring and odious debt. Sovereign-debt-restructuring proposals in the 
 
 30. The domestic analogy in the United States is the doctrine of equitable subordination. The 
doctrine stands apart from the question of how much a debtor’s obligations should be paid back and 
instead penalizes a creditor for its inequitable conduct. Indeed, Adam Feibelman argues that equitable 
subordination could be applied in the sovereign debt context. See Feibelman, supra note 23. 
 31. Bolton and Skeel would focus on odious regimes rather than odious debts. See Bolton & Skeel, 
supra note 8. This focus comes from the work that they want the doctrine to do—undermine repressive 
regimes. To spare the reader, however, this article uses the term “odious debt” to refer to all proposals 
in this genre, even if the focus is on the regime rather than the debt. 
 32. Bolton and Skeel have elsewhere proposed a mechanism to address the general problem of 
sovereign debt. See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a 
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 780–801 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bolton & Skeel, Inside the Black Box] (setting forth sovereign bankruptcy proposal); Patrick Bolton & 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 179 
(2005) [hereinafter Bolton & Skeel, Lender of Last Resort] (proposing a new and ambitious crisis 
lending role for the International Monetary Fund). 
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main seek to reduce debt to “sustainable” levels. What is sustainable, however, 
is a contentious issue. The question depends in large measure on what one 
views as the appropriate sacrifices a nation’s citizens should be asked to bear in 
order to service the country’s debt. The more money that one believes should 
be invested in the country’s economic development, the less will be available to 
pay foreign creditors. 
In deciding how much of a burden should remain on a country’s citizens, the 
nature of the past debt may play a role. One may be inclined to ask citizens to 
shoulder more repayment for money that was invested in the country. Paying 
back money used to enhance infrastructure may be more sustainable than 
paying back money that has been sent overseas to the private accounts of a 
country’s leaders. In this respect, there are obvious parallels to American 
bankruptcy law. As Mechele Dickerson points out, U.S. bankruptcy law is both 
committed to a fresh start for individual debtors and calibrates the extent of the 
fresh start based on the nature of the past debts.33 Although there are obvious 
differences—U.S. law tends to exempt morally problematic debts from 
discharge whereas incorporating the odious debt doctrine into a sovereign-debt 
framework would do the opposite—the intuition is the same. The extent of 
relief from past debts should depend in part on the nature of the debt. 
The goal here is not to defend any of the possible relationships between 
sovereign-debt restructuring and odious debt. Indeed, it is unclear whether one 
conception must necessarily dominate the others. Rather, the point is that how 
one approaches odious debt depends on how one views its interaction with 
sovereign-debt restructuring. The more one seeks to use the doctrine to relieve 
burdensome debts, the broader its scope. Conversely, the more one focuses on 
the nature of the old regime, the narrower the doctrine becomes. Differences in 
proposals turn in part on what one is trying to achieve. 
III 
THE IMPULSE TO MOVE FROM POLITICS TO LAW 
Despite competing views on the relationship between odious debt and 
sovereign-debt restructuring, most work in both areas shares a common theme. 
The proponents of new systems to address the problems of odious debt and 
sovereign-debt restructuring seek to move the availability of past-debt relief 
from the realm of politics to that of law. Both seek to establish criteria that 
would guide and constrain attempts at debt relief. Political considerations, to 
the extent that they are unavoidable, need to be cabined. A country’s ability to 
reduce its debt should not depend on who its friends are. 
 
 33. See Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Doctrine of Odious Debts: The Missing 
Link in the International Human Rights Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Summer 2007). 
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Indeed, some of the proposals expressly seek to lessen, if not remove, 
political influence.34 For example, in proposing a sovereign-debt-restructuring 
mechanism, Patrick Bolton and David Skeel argue that it should be 
administered by existing corporate bankruptcy courts.35 One reason they would 
not put such a mechanism inside the IMF is that “IMF decisionmaking has in 
some instances been driven more by political pressures by the United States or 
other G-7 members than by the economics of the crisis in question.”36 Similarly, 
in arguing for a more precise and more effective vision of the doctrine of odious 
debts, Christoph Paulus remarks that “[b]ecause of well-known reservations, 
this responsibility should not be accorded to the IMF/World Bank . . . .”37 Relief 
from debt should turn on the fiscal state of the country or the nature of the debt 
itself and not on the extent to which the country seeking relief is able to curry 
favor with those nations that can exercise influence. 
Whereas the desire to remove political influences is rarely defended, it 
seems to stem from at least two instincts. The first is a general instinct toward 
equal treatment. Lawyers, perhaps by virtue of their legal training, tend to value 
equal treatment toward those they view as similarly situated.38 Many lawyers 
recoil at suggestions that law and politics are the same. Moreover, while they 
may recognize that favoritism exists in the application of law, most would 
regard this as a problem. We do not celebrate the speeder whose connections 
allow him to escape the ticket he deserved. 
The second impulse toward equality may be that many approach the 
problems surrounding sovereign debt from a background in U.S. bankruptcy 
law. Of the authors contributing to this symposium, Mechele Dickerson, Adam 
Feibelman, Caroline Gentil, and David Skeel come from that tradition.39 One 
important strand of thought in bankruptcy scholarship is that insolvency 
systems should be designed so as to minimize a debtor’s cost of credit.40 Part of 
this work also stresses that, in doing so, bankruptcy courts should not attempt to 
 
 34. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 333, 343 (2005) (“One way of explaining the S[overeign] D[ebt] R[estructuring] M[odel] 
proposal is to view it as an effort to establish a rule-based framework for processing sovereign debt 
workouts with a minimum of official sector interference.”); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 42 (“We need an 
international ‘bankruptcy’ court, with no vested national interest, to deal with debt restructuring and 
relief . . . .”). 
 35. See Bolton & Skeel, Inside the Black Box, supra note 32, at 809–18. 
 36. Id. at 810. 
 37. Christoph G. Paulus, “Odious Debts” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
83, 101 (2005). 
 38. Another possible explanation would be that those people with a strong sense of equality are 
more likely to attend law school. Or it may be, contrary to my sense of casual empiricism, that lawyers 
are no bigger fans of equality than is the general populace. 
 39. One can readily identify others whose primary interest is American bankruptcy law and who 
have weighed in on the issues of odious debt and sovereign debt restructuring. See, e.g., Steven L. 
Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189 (2004). 
 40. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 
71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 56–65 (1992); Alan Schwarcz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 1199 (2005). 
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pick winners and losers.41 The ultimate fate of the business is left to the 
marketplace. All that bankruptcy can do is increase a company’s chances to the 
extent that it can increase the debtor’s access to funds and lower its cost of 
credit. Bankruptcy law, on this account, can only create mischief when it tries to 
advance a political agenda. 
This is not to say that a background in bankruptcy law means that one will 
take the same approach to the problems of odious debt and sovereign-debt 
restructuring. A vibrant doctrine of odious debt seeks to reduce the amount of 
such debt in the first instance. The aspirations of at least some backers of the 
doctrine are that it will cool the ardor of lenders seeking to lend money to 
certain regimes. The goal here is to decrease debt capacity in the hopes that a 
country’s future will not be squandered on the follies of the present, corrupt 
regime. 
The argument works in the other direction in the sovereign-debt literature. 
A substantial amount of work in that area addresses the effect of the ability to 
restructure sovereign debt on a county’s incentives to pay the debt, which in 
turn affect its ability to obtain financing in the first instance. The basic intuitions 
here come straight from corporate finance. By setting the rules at the optimal 
level, we can increase a country’s debt capacity. 
Despite these differing effects on a nation’s ability to borrow money, 
proposals to restructure debt according to bankruptcy rules by and large seek to 
put more law and less politics into the process. 
IV 
THE INVEVITABILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF  
POLITICS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RELIEF (ODIOUS OR OTHERWISE) 
Politics nonetheless seems to be everpresent in sovereign-debt workouts. 
The United States came to the rescue of Mexico because it seemed to be in the 
best interests of the United States to do so. The United States discharged the 
small debt that it was owed by Iraq. Moreover, the Bush Administration 
charged one of its most trusted political allies, James Baker, with crafting a 
solution to the Iraq debt problem. America and Europe attempted to pressure 
Argentina to seek a more modest debt restructuring than it desired. Moreover, 
to the extent lending is often the province of sovereigns rather than syndicates,42 
we would expect that political concerns would play an even larger role in all 
debt relief discussions. 
 
 41. See Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 42 (“[G]iven the nature of bankruptcy law, it is hard to see how [bankruptcy law] can 
work as a mechanism to remedy any existing unjustified inequality in the distribution of primary 
goods.”); Alan Schwarcz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 
1816–20 (arguing that bankruptcy law should “function only to reduce the costs to firms of debt 
finance.”); Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 1211–12; David A. Skeel, Jr., Giant Bailouts are Becoming a 
Misguided U.S. Cure-All, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, § 2, at 9. 
 42. On the rise of sovereign lenders, see Gelpern, supra note 22. 
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Such political influence is not surprising. Powerful governments seek to 
promote their interests abroad. Indeed, most citizens want their government to 
pursue such an agenda. Humanitarian concerns are part of the agenda for most 
countries. Both current indebtedness and past ill treatment can induce a 
country to use its influence in pursuing debt relief. It is nevertheless the case 
that such concerns are not the only reasons why rich countries seek debt relief 
for poor ones. The harm that a distressed country can inflict on a rich country’s 
interests is an important part of the calculus over how much effort a rich 
country will devote towards securing debt relief for a poor one. 
To be sure, the fact that a country seeks to further its own interests in 
international affairs does not doom the general project of international law. 
Laws can work to the benefit of all countries.43 Yet it has to be the case that for 
international law to develop in any particular area, the countries involved have 
to see a benefit in reducing and channeling their discretion. One cannot 
reasonably expect that countries will sign onto any system of international debt 
relief that they view as counter to their long-term interests. They will agree to 
cabin their political interests only if such an agreement itself furthers the ends 
of the state. 
In this light, it may be some time before we see international consensus 
emerge on either a sovereign-debt-restructuring mechanism or a useable 
doctrine of odious debt.44 Consider the United States. It is difficult to imagine 
the adoption of either an odious debt doctrine or sovereign-debt restructuring 
system without America’s active support. The United States, however, has a 
variety of potential interests when it confronts another country that has been 
the victim of a brutal regime or that is currently mired in financial distress. The 
United States may be a lender to such country, it may have banks that lent to 
the country,45 and its global–political agenda may be affected by such a country. 
It is fairly obvious that how these differing (and competing) interests balance 
out will differ across time and across countries. Under the current regime, the 
United States can balance its financial interests (including those of its citizens) 
against its political interests when faced with financial distress of any given 
country.46 It is difficult to see how it would be in the United States’ interest to 
give up this ability to balance ex post. 
Although the doctrine of odious debt could in theory provide the United 
States with some lever to attempt to oust an odious regime, it is unclear how 
 
 43. For an attempt to explain why countries find it in their interests to follow international law, see 
Andrew T. Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002). 
 44. One can find little political support for revamping the current debt restructuring regime, either 
through the implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism or a doctrine of odious debt 
that actually provides debt relief. 
 45. See Thomas Oatley & Jason Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L POL. 415 
(2004) (showing that higher levels of U.S. bank debt are associated with more generous lending by the 
IMF). 
 46. As Anna Gelpern points out, a country’s initial decision to make a loan tends to be driven 
more by political concerns than the expectation of financial reward. See Gelpern, supra note 22. 
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much this innovation would add to its toolbox. The United States already has a 
number of tools at its disposal, including economic sanctions and military force. 
It is far from clear that the odious debt doctrine would provide any marginal 
improvement in its ability to destabilize odious regimes. If anything, the 
doctrine could be more trouble than it is worth. The United States may well shy 
away from creating a system in which others could label a regime odious and 
seek to nullify its repayment obligations. 
The same analysis applies to other wealthy countries as well. Although they 
obviously do not share all of the aims of the United States, they have their own 
competing sets of interests at stake when another country seeks debt relief. 
Currently, they can evaluate these interests on a case-by-case basis. Proposals 
for a new odious debt doctrine and for sovereign-debt restructuring would have 
to promise them a better outcome across a range of cases. Moreover, the 
proposals would have to be in the individual interests of each country that could 
effectively block its implementation. Crafting regimes that satisfy these 
participation constraints is a daunting task. 
Of course, those advocating changes in sovereign-debt restructuring and the 
doctrine of odious debts have pointed out numerous advantages to their 
approaches. There are many proposals that may indeed be more normatively 
desirable than the current system. What these advocates have failed to do so far 
is to demonstrate to lending nations that it would be in their interest to give up 
the political clout they currently have when a country seeks debt relief. Political 
reality thus suggests that the more ambitious attempts to inject law-like 
predictability into the present debt relief system have little chance of adoption.47 
More provocatively, it may be that political considerations can play a 
positive role in this area. Rather then crafting regimes to avoid political 
influence, we should endeavor to find systems that harness it. To be sure, it is 
easy to conjure up ideal sovereign-debt-restructuring systems and a perfect 
odious debt doctrine. But in reality, we would expect them to fall short. Even if 
countries agree to a system that ostensibly limits their power, they will seek 
ways to influence the outcome.48 
To see the possibility for improvement, consider a system that guarantees a 
minimal level of relief to countries. This relief could be based on either the 
amount of debt the country has or the nature of the debt. The point is, rather 
than seek an optimal level of debt forgiveness, we should create a system that 
automatically grants relief on terms that all countries can agree to before the 
fact.49 (The Bolton–Skeel proposal may be an example of such a system in the 
 
 47. This is not to imply that these efforts are either worthless or misguided. Understanding what 
the ideal system would look like can help us better understand the system we currently have and the 
extent to which it falls short. 
 48. I am by no means the first to make this observation. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, 
Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 613, 639–40 (2001). 
 49. One does not necessarily have to worry about private lenders here. What they desire most is 
predictability so that they can price the credit they are extending. 
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area of odious debt.) The less that countries have to commit to initially, the 
more likely it is that they would be willing to give their consent. All would 
understand, however, that such a system would be a floor rather than a ceiling. 
Rich countries that found it in their interests to lobby for additional debt relief 
on a case-by-case basis would be free to do so. 
It would be generous to label the above suggestion even a “sketch” of a 
method for addressing issues of sovereign debt. A sustained effort to build such 
a system has to wait for another day. Crafting sovereign-debt regimes is 
difficult. In the commercial context, we rely on the assumption that all lenders 
by and large want to make money. Lenders use the levers of control available to 
them in order to maximize their financial return. In the sovereign context, the 
blend of commercial interests and political ones presents a daunting challenge. 
Governments have different levers of control than do private creditors. 
Moreover, in some situations governments will at least consider their financial 
interests, while in others the political interests will dominate. Going forward, we 
should strive to craft systems that do not seek to eliminate political interests but 




Odious debt and sovereign-debt restructuring are neither inextricably linked 
nor inevitability distinct. The problems of debt overhang and corrupt regimes 
can be tackled either simultaneously or separately. Regardless of the strategy 
that one adopts, one cannot ask for too much from the system. Debt relief in 
this context is and will be as much a matter of statecraft as it is of financial 
theory. Rather than fight this fact, we need to embrace it. Modest relief as a 
matter of right coupled with more generous relief as a matter of self-interest 
may lead to more overall debt relief than would otherwise be available. 
